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ABSTRACT 
In the past, fleet management has primarily had an asset management focus, with 
safety initiatives being reactive to particular incidents or events. More recently, it has 
been recommended that fleet managers should work to facilitate a safety conscious 
organisational culture/climate, though this has not yet been empirically investigated in 
a fleet setting. This study investigated the influence of fleet safety climate upon three 
self-reported measures of work-related driver safety: 1) current work-related driver 
behaviour; 2) past crash involvement while driving for work; and 3) past traffic 
offences while driving for work. A questionnaire was completed by 323 drivers from 
three Queensland based fleets. There was a significant positive relationship between 
fleet safety climate perceptions and the safety of work-related driver behaviour (r = 
.42). Multiple regression analysis revealed that safety climate perceptions were a 
significant predictor of current work-related driver behaviour and were a better 
predictor than other psychological and socio-demographic factors. However, further 
analyses showed that fleet safety climate did not significantly predict previous work-
related crash or offence involvement. Some organisational differences were also 
explored. These results suggest that while fleet safety climate influences current fleet 
driver behaviour, the long-term effect of this on crash and offence involvement 
remains unclear. In practical terms, organisations (particularly fleet managers and 
supervisors) need to consider the impact of organisational factors upon employee 
driver behaviour. Further research is required to investigate the association between 
fleet safety climate and on-road incidents (namely crash involvement and traffic 
offences). 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Why focus on work-related driver safety? 
In Australia, work-related driver safety is an increasingly pertinent issue for 
occupational health and safety, as on-road motor vehicle crashes are the leading 
cause of work-related fatalities (Haworth, 2002). Research by the Australian National 
Occupational Health and Safety Commission (NOHSC) showed that an average of 
26% of work-related fatalities (between 1989-1992), resulted from crashes on public 
roads during the course of work (NOHSC, 1998). In the state of Queensland, 37% of 
all fatal vehicle crashes between 1997-2000 involved a commercial vehicle (Meers, 
2002). The injuries associated with work-related crashes are estimated to cost 
Australia over half a billion dollars each year, and are twice as likely to cause 
disability and fatality than other occupational accidents (Wheatley, 1997). The issue 
of work-related road safety is also of international relevance. For example, in Sweden 
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work-related driving is the leading cause of occupational fatalities (Official Statistics 
of Sweden, 1992 as cited in Bylund, Björnstig, & Larsson, 1997). In the USA, 33% of 
work-related fatalities result from motor vehicle crashes (Moser, 2001), and 25% of 
all fatal and injury causing crashes occur during the course of work in the UK 
(Bibbings, 1997).   
 
Fleet safety strategies  
These statistics suggest that reducing the incidence of crashes and enhancing driver 
safety is a key priority for fleet safety management and occupational health and 
safety (Moser, 2001; Murray & Dubens, 1998; Murray, Newnam, Watson, Davey, & 
Schonfeld, 2002). Under Australian Workplace Health and Safety (WH&S) legislation 
and duty of care obligations, employers are responsible for minimising the risks 
involved in driving for work (Hoskins, 2003). Primarily this involves implementing 
control strategies such as safety policies and procedures, ensuring vehicle safety, 
and providing adequate training for employees. Further to this, the introduction of 
chain of responsibility laws increases the accountability of employers, managers, and 
all other workers involved in the chain of commercial transportation (NTC, 2004).  
 
Traditionally, the role of those involved in fleet management has centred on the 
economic management of vehicles as company assets (Haworth, Tingvall, & 
Kowadlo, 2000). Traditional strategies for improving safety have often involved 
implementing driver training programs. The evidence regarding the effectiveness of 
these techniques is mixed, and researchers have stressed that there are many other 
person-related influences upon driver safety and crash risk (such as psychological 
and cognitive factors) which may be neglected by employing only skill-based training 
(Watson, 2003). Gregersen et al. (1996), compared the effectiveness of four driver 
safety countermeasures in the Swedish telecommunications company (Televerket). 
These included driver training, road safety campaigns, discussion groups, and 
bonuses for ‘crash free driving’. Discussion groups and driver training led to 
significant reductions in crash risk over two years, but all strategies led to decreased 
crash costs. These results suggest that while the focus on improving on-road skills 
can be beneficial, it is not the only point for intervention. Research is needed to 
identify the benefits of other strategies for organisations.  
 
Over recent years, there have been calls for safety to become a core component of 
professional fleet management. Not only will this reduce the costs associated with 
commercial motor vehicle damage, but also the hidden costs resulting from injuries 
(Murray et al., 2002). It has been argued that fleet managers should work to create a 
proactive ‘fleet safety culture’ and ‘fleet safety climate’ within organisations (e.g. 
Moser, 2001; Murray, 2003; Murray & Dubens, 1998). This literature is often limited 
by a lack of research based support. One study however, found that inter-
organisational differences in drivers’ awareness of fleet safety policies were reflected 
by differences in drivers’ self-reported safety behaviour (Newnam, Watson, & Murray, 
2002). While this result provides some support for the notion of fleet safety climate, 
more rigorous investigations are required to empirically establish the extent of the link 
between organisational climate and fleet driver safety.     
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Safety climate theory and research 
The notion of safety climate has gained increasing attention in fleet safety literature in 
recent years. However in the safety sciences, researchers have discussed safety 
climate for over two decades (e.g. Glendon & Stanton, 2000; Guldenmund, 2000; 
Zohar, 1980). While there have been some points of contention, the term ‘safety 
climate’ is generally used to refer to workers’ perceptions about: what is considered 
normal safety practice in the organisation; how committed management are to safety; 
safety management systems such as policies and procedures; and work pressures 
(Flin, Mearns, O'Connor, & Bryden, 2000). That is, safety climate is a phenomena 
that arises within organisations and represents the overall mental construct or 
framework that employees have about how safety is treated in their workplace. The 
research literature suggests that organisations influence the safety of their 
employees’ behaviour through safety climate (i.e. workers’ perceptions of 
organisational safety shape their occupational behaviours). Research from various 
industrial settings has shown links between self-reported safety climate and company 
accident rates (Diaz & Cabrera, 1997; Varonen & Mattila, 2000), occupational injury 
rates and severity (Mearns, Flin, Gordon, & Fleming, 1998; Mearns, Whitaker, & Flin, 
2003), and workers compensation claims (O'Toole, 2002).  
 
In this paper, ‘fleet safety climate’ will refer to the mental framework or set of 
perceptions that drivers hold about fleet safety policies and practices in their 
organisation. This includes for example, workers’ perceptions about how committed 
managers and supervisors are to driver safety, how well fleet safety policies are 
communicated to employees, and their workload.  It is also important to note that 
while the terms culture and climate are commonly used interchangeably, theoretical 
and practical distinctions have been made between these concepts (Guldenmund, 
2000; Mearns & Flin, 1999; Reichers & Schneider, 1990). While a comprehensive 
discussion is beyond this review, this study has been designed with the distinction in 
mind.  
 
Safety climate refers to employees’ perceptions about safety practices, so it is 
psychological in nature. However, safety culture is a broader indication of 
organisational safety and includes for example organisational behaviours, accidents, 
injuries, attitudes, beliefs, practices, and rules (Guldenmund, 2000). Safety culture is 
complex and cannot be defined as purely psychological or behavioural, making it 
difficult to measure. Safety climate, on the other hand, is a phenomenon that 
emerges from the larger organisational safety culture and is often described as the 
psychological manifestation of safety culture. As such, fleet safety climate is nested 
within the wider organisation’s safety climate. An organisation may have many sub-
climates, and the fleet safety climate may differ depending on the nature of the 
organisation and the role of work-related driving within it.  
 
AIMS 
While there is evidence supporting the link between safety climate and occupational 
accidents and injuries, the evidence regarding a link between self-reported safety 
behaviour is limited. Nor has the relationship been empirically examined in the fleet 
setting. The aim of this study was to address this limitation by examining the 
association between fleet safety climate and the safety of drivers at work.  In doing 
so, it examines the relationship between fleet safety climate and three self-reported 
indicators of work-related driver safety, namely: 1) current work related driver 
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behaviour; 2) past crashes while driving for work; and 3) prior traffic offences while 
driving for work. 
 
In order to examine the relative influence of fleet safety climate, some additional 
variables which have been linked to driver safety were incorporated into the 
analyses. These included demographic and driving exposure factors, and general 
attitude towards driver safety. This latter variable was included due to the growing 
evidence indicating that attitudes are an important predictor of various driver 
behaviours such as aggressive driving and speeding (Parker, Lajunen, & Stradling, 
1998; Parker, Manstead, Stradling, Reason, & Baxter, 1992; Stradling & Parker, 
1997). 
 
METHOD 
Three Queensland based organisations with large vehicle fleets participated in the 
study. The study questionnaire was randomly distributed to drivers at each 
organisation via their internal mail systems. Instructions were included which 
emphasised the voluntary and anonymous nature of the research. Completed 
questionnaires were returned directly to the researchers at QUT to ensure participant 
anonymity. The study questionnaire consisted of several sets of items regarding their 
perceptions about: company commitment to fleet and driver safety (fleet safety 
climate); their attitudes towards driver safety; their current work-related driver 
behaviour; past crash involvement and traffic offences while driving for work; and 
other socio-demographic information. It is important to note that participants were 
asked to report crash and offence involvement for the previous three year period to 
ensure sufficient numbers for analysis. A total of 329 drivers responded, representing 
an overall response rate of 33%. Six drivers were not included in analysis due to 
missing information resulting in an overall sample of 323 drivers. 
 
Fleet safety climate was measured using a modified version of the Safety Climate 
Questionnaire (Glendon & Litherland, 2001), and required drivers to rate on a 5-point 
scale the extent to which statements about fleet safety and occupational safety in 
general applied to their organisation. It included 6 factors which measured 
perceptions about management commitment to fleet safety, fleet safety rules, driver 
training practices, work pressures, work-relationships and organisational 
communication.  
 
Current driver behaviour was measured using a modified version of the shortened 
Driver Behaviour Questionnaire (Lawton, Parker, Manstead, & Stradling, 1997) and 
was modelled on a similar scale used in previous research (see Newnam et al., 
2002). This scale asked drivers to estimate on a 6-point scale how often they commit 
errors, traffic violations, and aggressive violations. Items were also included about 
fatigue, tiredness, distraction, and mobile phone use, as research has previously 
indicated that these are key risk factors for work-related drivers (Salminen & 
Lahdeniemi, 2002). Items about drivers’ vehicle maintenance behaviours were also 
included to measure an important means through which drivers can demonstrate 
proactive safety behaviour. Items about reversing behaviour were also included as 
preliminary research and anecdotal evidence based on discussion with fleet 
personnel, indicated that reversing is a significant safety issue for fleets. Overall, 
included in the final analyses were factors which measured: driving errors, violations, 
psychological distraction (including tiredness and mobile phone use), and vehicle 
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maintenance behaviour. Driver attitudes were measured using the Driver Attitude 
Questionnaire (Parker, Stradling, & Manstead, 1996) which has been shown to be a 
useful measure of key attitudes towards driver safety. This questionnaire asks drivers 
to rate on a 5-point scale the extent to which they agree with statements about drink 
driving, close following, overtaking, and speeding.    
 
RESULTS 
Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 shows demographic characteristics and driving exposure information for the 
sample. Across each organisation the majority of drivers were male1 and between 
40-49 years of age, possessing over 21 years of driving experience. Most reported 
spending under 21 hours per week driving for work, and driving under 30,000 
kilometres per year for work purposes. The majority indicated that they drove a 
company owned or leased vehicle (87% overall), which was marked with the 
company’s logo (96% of company owned/leased vehicles). The most commonly 
reported vehicle types driven were cars (38%), followed by utilities (27%), and four-
wheel drive vehicles (24%).  
 
Table 1. Demographic Characteristics and Driving Exposure Information 
 Organisations 
Variable A  
(n = 70) 
B 
(n = 164) 
C 
(n = 89) 
Total 
(N = 323) 
Response rate 36% 33% 30% 33% 
Gender 
  Male 
  Female 
 
84.3% 
15.7% 
 
98.8% 
1.2% 
 
90.9% 
9.1% 
 
93.5% 
6.5% 
Age (years) 
  17-24 
 
8.6% 
 
1.2% 
 
1.1% 
 
2.8% 
  25-29 14.3% 4.3% 5.7% 6.9% 
  30-39 20.0% 21.5% 23.9% 21.8% 
  40-49 32.9% 49.1% 40.9% 43.3% 
  50-59 22.9% 21.5% 27.3% 23.4% 
  ≥ 60 1.4% 2.5% 1.1% 1.9% 
Driving experience (years) 
  < 1 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
  1-3 - 0.6% - 0.3% 
  4-7 5.7% 3.0% - 2.8% 
  8-15 24.3% 7.9% 11.4% 12.4% 
  16-20 8.6% 15.2% 15.9% 14.0% 
  ≥ 21 61.4% 73.2% 72.7% 70.5% 
Exposure (hours per week) 
  ≤ 10 
 
7.1% 
 
36.0% 
 
65.2% 
 
37.8% 
  11-20 40.0% 38.5% 31.5% 36.9% 
  21-30 20.0% 14.9% 1.1% 12.2% 
  ≥ 31 32.9% 10.6% 2.2% 13.1% 
 
                                                 
1 It is important to note that due to the small number of female participants, consideration was given to 
excluding females from statistical analysis. However, as this ratio reflected the nature of the industries 
involved they were included to ensure that the sample was representative of the population of fleet 
drivers in these organisations.  
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Self-reported driver behaviour 
The bivariate correlations between the variables are shown in Table 2. There were 
moderate positive correlations between fleet safety climate and driver behaviour, and 
driver safety attitudes and behaviour.  There was a weak correlation between fleet 
safety climate and driver safety attitudes. Multiple regression analysis revealed that 
together fleet safety climate, driver safety attitudes and socio-demographic factors 
accounted for 26% of the variance in driver behaviour, F (4, 314) = 27.17, p < .001 
(see Table 3). Inspection of the Beta (β) coefficients (see Table 3) showed that fleet 
safety climate was the strongest predictor, uniquely accounting for 16% of the 
variance in driver behaviour. Driver safety attitudes was the next strongest predictor, 
accounting for 6%.  
 
Table 2. Bivariate Correlations (r) Between Variables (N = 319)   
Variable Driver 
Behaviour 
1 2 3 4 
1. Fleet safety climate .42** - .18** .00 .01 
2. Driver safety attitudes .30**  -   .11*  -.01 
3. Driving experience .13*   - .01 
4. Driving exposure 
(hours per week) 
.15*    - 
*p < .05. **p < .001 
 
Table 3. Standard Regression Analysis for Driver Behaviour (N = 319) 
*p < .05. **p < .001. 
 
Self-reported crashes and offences 
Logistic regressions were conducted to examine the influence of climate, attitudes, 
driving exposure and experience on past crash and offence involvement. Fifty-eight 
drivers reported being involved in at least one crash while driving for work and 86 
drivers reported committing at least one traffic offence while driving for work. Logistic 
regression (target = no work-related crashes) revealed that overall the variables did 
not predict work-related crash involvement, p = .15. Logistic regression (target = no 
work-related traffic offences) also revealed that overall the four variables did not 
predict work-related offences, p = .45.  
 
To further explore the data, a series of analyses were undertaken to examine 
differences in fleet safety climate and driver safety attitudes as a function of work-
related crash and traffic offence involvement. As shown in Table 4, drivers who 
reported being involved in a crash reported significantly less safe driving behaviour 
than those who were not involved in a crash, t (321) = -2.19, p < .05. However, there 
were negligible differences in driver behaviour scores as a function of whether 
participants had committed any traffic offences (p = .19). Although the differences in 
mean fleet safety climate scores between drivers who had and had not been involved 
 
Variable 
 
B 
Std. 
error 
 
β 
sr2
(unique)
 
R2 
 
Adj R2
Fleet safety climate   .26** .03 .38 .16   
Driver safety attitudes   .20** .05 .22 .06   
Driving experience    .05* .02 .11 .02   
Driving exposure   .04* .01 .15 .03  
.26** 
 
.25 
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in a crash were not significant (p = .22). It is worth noting that drivers who were not 
involved in a crash did report safer climate perceptions. There were no fleet safety 
climate differences between those who reported committing traffic offences and 
those who did not (p = .79).  There were no differences in driver safety attitudes 
between those involved in a crash and those not (p = .82). However, drivers who 
reported traffic offences had significantly lower driver safety attitude scores than 
those who did not, t (321) = -2.05, p < .05.  
 
Table 4. Mean Scores as a Function of Work-Related Crashes and Offences (N = 
323) 
 Yes No t 
Fleet driver behaviour 
 Crashes 
 Offences 
 
4.84 (.42) 
4.90 (.41) 
 
4.98 (.42) 
4.97 (.42) 
 
-2.19* 
-1.32 
Fleet safety climate 
 Crashes 
 Offences 
 
3.56 (.60) 
3.64 (.65) 
 
3.67 (.62) 
3.66 (.61) 
 
-1.23 
-.26 
Driver safety attitudes 
 Crashes 
 Offences 
 
3.47 (.48) 
3.38 (.48) 
 
3.46 (.45) 
3.49 (.44) 
 
.23 
-2.05* 
Note. Values in parentheses represent standard deviations. 
* p < .05 
 
Organisational differences 
A one-way ANOVA revealed that there were significant differences in fleet safety 
climate scores between organisations as shown in Table 5 below. Post-hoc 
comparisons (using a Bonferroni adjustment) showed that the mean fleet safety 
climate score for Fleet B was significantly greater than Fleet C (p < .05). This 
suggests that Fleet B drivers held more positive fleet safety climate perceptions than 
Fleet C drivers. There were no significant differences in driver behaviour scores 
between organisations. As can be seen in Table 5, although not significant the 
differences between organisations in driver behaviour reflected that of the fleet safety 
climate differences.    
 
Table 5. Mean Fleet Safety Climate and Driver Behaviour Scores by Organisation (N 
= 322) 
 Fleet A Fleet B Fleet C F 
Fleet safety climate 3.59 (.62) 3.74 (.62) 3.54 (.60) 3.61* 
Fleet driver behaviour 4.97 (46) 4.99 (.40) 4.87 (.42) 2.29 
Note. Values in parentheses represent standard deviations.  
* p < .05 
 
Drivers’ self reported involvement in work-related crashes and offences are shown in 
Table 6. Drivers from Fleet A reported the most crashes, followed by Fleet B and C 
respectively. Further analysis showed that the difference between Fleets A and C 
was significant, χ2 (1, N = 159) = 6.77, p < .01. This suggests that drivers from Fleet 
A were significantly more likely to have been involved in at least one crash than 
drivers from Fleet C. There were no differences in self-reported traffic offences 
between organisations.  
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Table 6. Crash and Offence Involvement by Organisation (N = 323) 
 Fleet A Fleet B Fleet C Chi Square 
Crashes (≥ 1) 25.7% 18.9% 10.1%  
No Crashes 74.3% 81.1% 89.9% 6.68* 
     
Offences (≥ 1) 30.0% 24.4% 28.1%  
No offences 70.0% 75.6% 71.9% 0.93 
* p < .05 
 
DISCUSSION 
The influence of fleet safety climate 
Results from the multiple regression analysis revealed that fleet safety climate was 
the strongest statistical predictor of work-related driver behaviour. This suggests that 
employees’ overall perceptions about organisational fleet safety practices had a 
stronger association with their behaviour than other socio-demographic (driving 
experience and work-related driving exposure) and psychological factors (driver 
safety attitudes). However, logistic regressions revealed that none of the variables 
were significant predictors of past work-related crash or traffic offence involvement. 
Further analysis showed that there were no differences in fleet safety climate or 
driver safety attitudes between those drivers who reported being involved in a crash 
and those who did not. Similarly, there were no differences in fleet safety climate 
between drivers who reported being involved in an offence and those who did not. 
However, drivers who reported having no work-related traffic offences had 
significantly safer attitudes towards driving.  
 
Organisational differences 
To further explore the concept of fleet safety climate, differences in employees’ self-
reported perceptions and behaviours between organisations were investigated. 
There were some organisational differences between Fleets B and C, where Fleet B 
drivers reported more positive perceptions of organisational fleet safety practices. 
While there were no statistically significant differences in driver behaviour between 
organisations, drivers from Fleet B reported safer driving behaviour than Fleet C. 
Suggesting that some of the organisational differences in employee safety climate 
were reflected in driver behaviour. However, analysis of self-reported crash and 
offence involvement did not reflect these differences.       
 
Interpreting the results: The role of fleet safety climate 
The results provide mixed evidence regarding the potential role played by 
employees’ fleet safety climate perceptions. On one hand, the evidence suggests 
that, when all other factors are treated as equal, fleet safety climate had a stronger 
statistical association with self-reported driver behaviour than the other factors 
considered in this study (including attitudes and demographic factors). If so, then the 
results can be interpreted as suggesting that organisational fleet safety practices may 
influence employees’ level of safety when driving for work. Similarly, some of the 
organisational differences in fleet safety climate were reflected in differences in 
drivers’ self reported behaviour. On the other hand, the logistic regressions found 
that none of the factors included in the analyses predicted self-reported crashes or 
offences. Nor were the organisational differences in fleet safety climate reflected by 
the crash involvement differences. 
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These findings highlight that the nature of work-related driver safety is complex. 
Organisations and fleet managers in particular, need to implement practices and 
policies which are based on both WH&S legislative requirements and the findings of 
current research. The results of this study suggest that the past focus on driver 
training should be complemented by consideration for the impact of organisational 
factors. While the results do not provide direct support for a fleet management focus 
on creating proactive fleet safety cultures, they suggest that organisations do in some 
way influence their employees’ driving behaviour. At the very least, the results 
indicate that this occurs through the influence that organisational practices have upon 
employee perceptions. In turn, this suggests that organisations may benefit from 
considering the impact that their policies and practices have upon employee driver 
safety. In practice, this may involve taking a multi-pronged approach to fleet safety 
which recognises the need to focus on investigating and enhancing organisational 
practices, as well as driver training. 
 
Limitations 
The results pertaining to crashes and traffic offences suggest that fleet safety climate 
may not necessarily be reflected in past on-road events. This may be indicative of the 
fact that crashes and offences were measured in terms of the previous three year 
period. As safety climate is likely to be a fluid construct that may change over time, 
this may have influenced these results. Respondents may also have suffered from 
recall biases when thinking about past traffic incidents and behaviours. For example, 
those who believe they are safe drivers may suffer biases when asked to recall their 
own behaviour. Additionally, crashes are complex events which have a number of 
contributing factors such as psychological, demographic, neurological and perceptual 
factors, the on-road environment or situation. It was not the aim of this study to 
account for a comprehensive array of influences, and as such this may limit results 
pertaining to crashes and offences. The relationship between driver safety attitudes 
and offence involvement may also reflect the more static nature of attitudes as a 
psychological variable. That is, while employees’ perceptions will change over time 
as a direct reflection of organisational change, attitudes may not shift as freely given 
their dispositional nature. 
 
It is important to note that some methodological limitations restrict the extent that the 
results can be generalised to other settings and vehicle fleets. Firstly, the 
organisations participating in the study had already demonstrated a commitment to 
driver safety, as evidenced by their preparedness to participate. Secondly, although 
the three fleets included drivers from both metropolitan and rural areas, it should be 
acknowledged that they were all operated solely in Queensland (and under the 
legislation and regulations of that state). Thirdly, due to the voluntary nature of this 
study drivers were self-selected for participation. This may have minimised the 
response rate (although 33% is acceptable for a study of this nature), reducing the 
overall representativeness of the driver sample. Finally, it is important to note that the 
analyses included and the resulting interpretations are based on self-reported 
information. While this is a commonly accepted approach, this should be considered 
when interpreting the results.  
 
Future directions 
Past research had failed to investigate the association between employees’ 
perceptions about their organisation’s fleet safety practices and the safety of their on-
10 
road behaviour when driving for work. This study aimed to address this by examining 
the statistical relationship between global/general measures of fleet safety climate 
and driver safety. The results suggest that overall fleet safety climate has some 
influence over driver safety which may be a stronger than some other psychosocial 
and socio-demographic factors. However, it does not indicate which specific 
organisational practices or which elements of fleet safety climate influence which 
specific on-road behaviours. Currently, further explorative investigation is being 
undertaken to address this research question. This research aims to examine for 
instance, which elements of fleet safety climate have the strongest influence upon 
aggressive behaviour, feeling distracted, or errors, while driving for work. Further 
research also needs to address the methodological issues associated with 
investigating the relationship between fleet safety climate and traffic crashes and 
offences. 
 
Conclusions 
When taking a systems approach to road user behaviour, work-related driver safety 
is certainly a key factor of concern. This study suggests that organisations may 
shape individuals’ work-related driving behaviour indirectly through the organisational 
fleet safety climates that evolve. On the other hand, the evidence linking fleet safety 
climates with crashes and offences is limited due to methodological constraints. 
Future research needs to address these limitations. Organisations should consider 
the association between fleet safety climate and work-related driver behaviour when 
addressing fleet safety.    
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